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ABSTRACT 
 Ukraine is a country heavily dependent on other countries for its natural 
gas supply, leaving it vulnerable to interruptions in supply.  One of its largest 
suppliers, Russia, has twice taken drastic means of physically closing the 
pipelines, thereby cutting off this supply and illustrating to Ukraine and the world 
the leverage that it can exercise.  While at the present time the cut-offs have lasted 
no longer than a few weeks, future cut-offs could become more common and 
longer in duration.  When compounded with the troubled history between the two 
countries, one can quickly see the precipitous situation that has the potential to 
escalate into armed conflict. 
  The methodology used in this thesis sought to identify a renewable energy 
technology that could help reduce this dependency on foreign energy.  The 
technology must be feasible considering the climate, viable considering the cost, 
and efficient in the production of an alternative fuel source.  Biogas plants 
(anaerobic digestion) were identified as satisfying all three of these conditions.  
These plants can use as an input any biodegradable material, but corn silage was 
quickly identified as the optimal input due to its low cost and high biogas yield.  
Rural farmers were then identified as the optimal target population for these 
digesters, due to their ownership of a large amount of land and having the existing 
infrastructure in place to produce corn silage.  The annual natural gas demand of 
the rural farmers was found to be 4,200 cubic meters, which was used in the 
calculation of the size of the actual digester that would produce this exact amount 
of gas annually.  The size of the digester was determined to be 9 cubic meters.   
A financial analysis of the biogas plants then proved that this technology 
produced a large amount of natural gas equivalent, and also provided financial 
profits to those who constructed them.  However, a problem soon arose.  How 
could rural farmers be expected to afford the lump sum payment necessary for the 
construction of the digester?     
A microfinance institution was then theorized that would provide the 
upfront capital to construct these plants, who would then lease these plants to 
rural farmers.  These rural farmers would repay the lease over a five year term and 
would benefit from the opportunity cost from synthesizing their own fuel.  A 
financial analysis of the borrower and the institution determined that both parties 
would benefit financially from the institution, with borrowers experiencing profits 
in year 1 and the institution achieving self-sufficiency in year 7. 
The final section reports the impacts and final results that this institution 
could potentially have on the country of Ukraine.  First, it evaluates the amount of 
carbon dioxide offsets generated by these digesters.  Second, it values these 
carbon offsets by using the market price of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) to 
identify a potential funding opportunity for the institution.  Finally, it measures 
the total amount of natural gas that all digesters in operation would generate and 
its impact on Ukraine’s importation of natural gas from foreign countries. 
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ADVICE TO FUTURE HONORS STUDENTS 
 
 If you’re reading this, it probably means you’re being forced to, which 
means you’re probably already following my first piece of advice which is to 
register for the Capstone seminar class in your junior year!  If I hadn’t been 
forced to come to terms with the fact that I had to complete this project, I 
probably would have procrastinated and my senior year would not have been 
nearly as enjoyable as it has been. 
 That’s an important point: balance your time!  Set aside large blocks of 
time (at least three hours in my opinion) to work on your Capstone weekday 
evenings and weekend afternoons, but don’t let the stress of your research 
affect the rest of your senior year!  Try to disconnect yourself from your 
project when you’re not working on it and “plug yourself” back in when you 
sit back down to do more research.   
 Make sure to file your “change of address” form to 306 Bowne Hall 
because if you’re anything like me and you have terrible wireless internet at 
your house, you’ll be spending a lot of time there.  In fact, Joe Ralbovsky and 
I kept track of how many hours we spent there, how many drinks consumed, 
and how many bags of popcorn consumed there in the spring semester of 2011 
by tucking a sign-up sheet behind the utility box.  See if you can beat my 
record of 46 hours over the course of the semester.  If you have, please find 
me wherever I am (I imagine in the future all people will be tracked 24/7 by 
mobile GPS devices) so I can congratulate you on your academic prowess. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“A dispute between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas turned nasty 
on Tuesday, as gas deliveries to a swath of European countries were cut off 
entirely amid freezing winter temperatures. The escalating fight, which began 
last week as a commercial disagreement over pricing, evoked a similar cutoff 
three years ago and reignited debate across the European Union over its deep 
reliance on Russian energy.” 
“The two state gas companies blamed each other for halting supplies. 
Russian analysts claimed that a looming presidential election in Ukraine lay at 
the root of the dispute, while energy analysts elsewhere cited pipeline politics 
and a breakdown in the basic transit contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz 
as likely causes” (Osborn, Chazan, and Miller, 2009).    
 Ukraine’s strategic location, sharing its eastern border with Russia, has 
led President Viktor Yanukovych to declare the country the “bridge between 
the East and the West” (Yanukovych, 2010).  BBC News reported that 
perhaps Ukraine’s most important, and most volatile, asset is the fact that 
nearly 80% of all natural gas supplies that originate in Russia must physically 
pass through Ukraine in pipelines on their way to consumption in western 
Europe (“EU Reaches,” 2009).  Yet these pipelines present both opportunities 
and vulnerabilities.  While Ukraine is able to charge a transport tariff to 
Russia that generates significant revenue, Russia has an almost unparalleled 
bargaining chip: agree to our demands or we’ll cut off the gas supply to your 
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country.  To complicate matters further, past instances of high-level 
corruption and missed payments on the part of Ukraine has left Russia 
skeptical and distrustful of Ukraine’s actions.  In response, Russia has twice 
made good on its promise to completely shut off this supply to Ukraine.             
 As a result, it is imperative that Ukraine begin focusing its efforts on 
alternative sources of energy.  Many inside and outside of Ukraine are 
exploring the concept of using various forms of renewable energy to achieve 
that goal.  This paper will analyze the potential of using small-scale renewable 
energy projects that will be feasible and complement the country’s geography 
and current structures.  While there are numerous technologies currently being 
implemented around the world, this thesis will primarily focus on the potential 
for small-scale anaerobic digesters that would generate biogas, which is a 
natural gas substitute and could be used in the same heaters that Ukrainians 
now use.  Similar small-scale biogas projects have already been implemented 
in Nepal, Moldova, and in countries throughout Africa, just to name a few.  
 The environmental impacts of reducing greenhouse gases may be 
obvious to the reader, but the financial impacts may not be as apparent.  The 
production of biogas on-site from a digester would allow the owner to reduce 
significantly the cost of their fuel supply and become independent from 
others’ unpredictable actions. 
The construction costs of these digesters are too high to reasonably 
expect people to be able to afford with a down payment.  However, in many 
cases it is also impossible for these same people to borrow any amount of 
    
 
3 
 
money from traditional banks, due to little or non-existent credit and lack of 
collateral.  This is where the role of microfinance can come into play as a 
potential solution.   
Microfinance is the provisioning of credit to individuals that are not 
typically extended credit through traditional financial instruments.  While 
there are numerous sources of funds in order to provide this credit, this thesis 
will seek to explore the “Kiva approach” which for the purposes of this paper 
will include a web-based portal that allows forward-thinking, 
environmentally-minded individuals that recognize the myriad opportunities 
these funds would provide to lend their money for a period of time.   
In summary, this thesis seeks to answer the question, “What if it was 
possible to construct a project that would not only help to address Ukraine’s 
energy dependency, but have reverberating geopolitical, environmental, and 
potentially financial impacts for decades to come?  And if this was possible, 
how could it be funded in a country who, because of lack of resources, has 
updated very little of its existing energy technology?”    
In order to answer this question, this paper will first provide 
background information regarding the history and geopolitical structure of 
Ukraine, new renewable technologies that could potentially help to replace 
natural gas, and the emerging international development tool known as 
microfinance.  In section 5, the paper will then apply the historical research to 
the current situation by evaluating first the financial feasibility of anaerobic 
digestion, considering the geographic restraints of the region in which they 
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will be constructed.  Section 6 will analyze the opportunity for a microfinance 
institution to be created to help provide capital for the construction of these 
digesters, evaluating from both the borrower’s (where the digesters are built) 
and the lender’s (the institution’s) perspective.  Finally, section 7 will use the 
forecasts of growth from section 6 to illustrate the results and impacts this 
institution could have in the region and in the world. 
 
2. The History of Ukraine: Leading up to the Crisis 
 
2a. The Forging of Ukraine and Russia's Relationship 
 
 The complicated story between Russia and Ukraine begins nearly 
1,200 years ago with the establishment of the Kievan Rus' state, a once-
powerful medieval state that was invaded by the Mongol people and 
disintegrated in 1240 (“Kievan Rus,” 2007).  After this disintegration, Russia 
succeeded in uniting the northern Rus' provinces, including the territories of 
modern-day Russia and Ukraine that would serve as the foundation for a long 
and interconnected relationship for centuries to come. 
 For hundreds of years Ukraine remained a conquered territory, being 
occupied as a whole by Lithuania and Poland until partitioning by Poland split 
the country in half.  While the Western portion of Ukraine was taken over by 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Eastern portion was incorporated into the 
Russian Empire.  It is important to note this early division in territory, as we 
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will see later the effects that this division continues to have on Ukrainian 
society.   
 With the Bolshevik Revolution putting an end to the Russian Empire 
in 1917, one of Ukraine's occupants was defeated and Ukraine declared its 
independence on January 22nd, 1918 for the first time in its history ("Brief 
Ukraine History," 2011).   Although independent, Poland's continued 
occupation of western Ukraine meant that Ukraine would not be unified. 
 According to the U.S. Department of State, the modern state of 
Ukraine emerged in 1922, when the central and eastern regions were 
incorporated into the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic was officially created (“Background Note,” 2010).  Subjugated to 
oppressive and socialist programs, "the Soviet government under Stalin 
created an artificial famine (called 'Holodomor' in Ukrainian) as part of his 
forced collectivization policies, which killed millions of previously 
independent peasants and others throughout the country. Estimates of deaths 
from the 1932-33 Holodomor alone range from 3 million to 7 million" 
("Background Note," para. 11).  In 1939, following the invasion of Poland by 
Soviet and German troops, western Ukraine was annexed by the Soviet Union, 
uniting modern Ukraine for the first time in its history and increasing its 
territory by 50,600 square miles and increasing its population by over 7 
million people (Subtelny, 1988).  Now unified, Ukraine continued to lack 
independence.   
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 Ukraine remained under this Soviet rule for nearly seventy years until 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 set into motion a series of events 
that finally saw Ukraine emerge as an independent, unified country in August 
of 1991.   
 If we review the history of Ukraine, we see that only during two 
periods (from 1918-1922 and from 1991 - present) has Ukraine experienced 
independence.  Yuri Borovsky, a Masters student at Syracuse University 
studying public diplomacy who was born in Kyiv and has lived in Ukraine all 
of his life, cites this singular fact as being a fundamental cause for the lack of 
nationalism in Ukraine and the subsequent complex relationship with Russia, 
a country who has shaped almost all aspects of Ukrainian life (Borovsky, 
personal communication, November 18, 2010). 
 Obviously, Ukraine and Russia's long territorial history translates to a 
plethora of linguistic, social, and cultural linkages that this paper will not 
explore for brevity's sake.  These linkages continue to this day, but some 
Ukrainians look favorably towards these links as opportunities to play a 
mediating role with the East and the West.  For example, Ukraine’s current 
president, Viktor Yanukovych once said that, “We are a nation with a 
European identity, but we have historic cultural and economic ties to Russia 
as well. We can benefit from both” (Yanukovych, 2010).  This paper seeks to 
explore one of the most valuable, and physical, links between the two 
countries: the precious natural gas pipelines that flow from Russia through 
Ukraine.   
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2b. Ukraine's Energy Dependency on Russia   
 
 Ukraine's current industrial production is a result of decades of 
subsidization and inefficiency, as Ukraine was one of the primary industrial 
producers of the Soviet Union.  For example, in the post-war years of the 
Soviet Union, the industrial productivity of Ukraine doubled over the pre-war 
level (Magocsi, 1996).  In addition, the rapid urbanization of Ukraine during 
the 1950s and 1960s dramatically increased its demand for energy.     
 Before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine's arrangements 
with Russia provided for cheap natural gas to flow through the pipelines and 
subsidize the costs of this fuel.  As a result, little effort was made to conserve 
natural gas and the industrial processes that were established before 1991 did 
not take into consideration the high inefficiency of the process (Evans, 1998).  
Following Ukraine's independency and its subsequent transition to a market 
economy, the country experienced a seven-year recession that saw its gross 
domestic product (GDP) fall by 68%, industrial output fall by 52% and capital 
investments fall by 74% (Pirani, 2007).  This recession greatly affected the 
ability of businesses and consumers to modernize their equipment.  As a result, 
much of the countries' domestic heating systems and industries are still 
heavily reliant on Russian gas imports (Osborn, 2009, January 5). 
 Since becoming independent, Ukraine has lost almost all of the natural 
gas subsidies it had previously enjoyed from Russia.  Ukraine is a country that 
has seen the cost of its natural gas rise from $50 USD per 1000 cubic meters 
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(cm) as late as 2005 to $250 USD per 1000 cm in 2009, a 500% increase in 
price over the course of only four years (Osborn, 2009, January 2).  All 
amounts in this thesis that are dollar-denominated have been converted into 
U.S. dollars from the original currency at exchange rates current as of April 
22nd, 2011. 
 While Ukraine's consumption of natural gas in 2010 has decreased 
approximately 39% since an all-time high of 84.9 billion cubic meters (bcm) 
consumed in 2008, much of this decrease is probably attributed to the global 
recession's impact on a decrease in manufacturing and the country continues 
to be the 14th highest consumer of natural gas in the world ("Natural Gas 
Consumption," 2009).   
 Ukraine's demand for natural gas remains high, while its domestic 
annual production of natural gas has remained stagnant at approximately 20 
bcm ("Natural Gas Production," 2009).  With such high consumption, Ukraine 
does not export any of its natural gas, but must import the difference between 
their domestic production and their consumption, which the International 
Energy Agency estimates at around 45 bcm annually.  Natural gas constitutes 
nearly 65% of all energy imports for Ukraine ("2008 Energy Balance," 2008).  
In addition to this, the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 
International Energy Annual Report (2005) found that nearly 69% of all 
natural gas imports come from Russia directly.  While the remaining natural 
gas may originate in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Russia's state-owned gas 
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monopoly Gazprom delivers this natural gas to Ukraine's border through a 
pipeline system ("Ukraine: Economy," 2009).   
 Yet Russia is not the only player in this natural gas relationship due to 
the geographical necessity for 80% of all Russian natural gas pipelines, on 
their way to consumption in western Europe, to run through Ukrainian 
territory.  Ukraine officially owns these pipelines that are located within their 
territory and charges a tariff to Russia for the ability to transport through these 
pipelines.  Russia has recognized their vulnerability and Ukraine's leverage in 
this situation and has, accordingly, begun the construction of two major 
pipelines named Nord Stream and South Stream that will be completed by 
2015 and will circumvent all Ukrainian territory by being constructed 
underneath the Baltic and the Black Seas, respectively (Nord Stream AG, 
2007). 
 With this precarious relationship adding fodder to an already-fragile 
region, it is easy to imagine this situation erupting into conflict, as it did in 
2006 and 2009. 
 
2c. The Well Runs Dry: The Gas Shut-Offs of 2006 and 2009 
 
 After a series of price and non-payment disputes arose between 
Ukraine and Russia in the 1990s, the situation escalated in May 2005, when it 
was discovered that approximately 7.8 bcm of natural gas that Gazprom had 
deposited in Ukrainian storage units had not been made available to the 
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company.  Gazprom quickly alleged that this natural gas had been stolen by 
the Ukrainian authorities, but the issue was resolved by July 2005 ("Gazprom 
and Naftogaz," 2005).  However, price disputes and gas supply agreements 
could not be settled by the end of 2005 and therefore on January 1, 2006, 
Ukraine for the first time began to see the pressure in its pipelines begin to 
drop. 
 The supply, however, was restored three days later on January 4, 2006, 
in large part because of the logistics of the shut-off.  Because 80% of all 
Russian gas exports to western Europe must flow through Ukraine, Russia had 
no way of cutting off the supply to Ukraine without interrupting important 
trade relationships with western European consumers.   
 While Ukraine had agreed to gradual price rises during the various 
resolutions and agreements that resulted, Gazprom argued that the rise in 
world gas prices necessitated larger increases in price.  By the end of 2008 a 
price agreement had not been decided upon and the newspaper RIA Novosti 
reported that another natural gas disruption resulted on January 1, 2009, as 
Russia halted completely an export of 90 million cm per day to Ukraine 
("Russia Fully Cuts," 2009).  This interruption had the "domino effect" of 
affecting the supply of many European Union countries, yet the dispute was 
not settled after 20 days.  On January 21, 2009, Reuters reported that Ukraine 
agreed to pay Gazprom the world price for natural gas with a 20% discount in 
2009 and the full world price in 2010 ("Russia and Ukraine," 2009). 
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   In order to examine the impact that these shut-offs can have in 
Ukraine, one must first explore the vulnerabilities of Ukraine when these 
interruptions occur and where the priorities of the government lie when it has 
a limited supply of natural gas. 
 
2d. Domestic Impact of Interruptions in Supply  
 
 In order to hedge itself against such unpredictability in natural gas 
supply, Ukraine has built up substantial amounts of reserve gas in 
underground storage facilities (Woehrel, 2009).  These reserves have been 
projected to serve the country's demand for a few months.  Until this point, 
this reserve has been adequate as Russia has been unable to cut off the supply 
for more than 20 days, yet with Nord and South Stream coming online in 2015, 
Russia will be able to halt supplies to Ukraine without affecting supplies to 
western Europe.  As a result, future interruptions in supply could last longer 
than Ukraine's available reserves.   
 Recent developments have impacted the necessary response of 
Ukraine if a disruption in supply were to occur again.  As a result of the 
Ukrainian-Russian crisis, the European Union adopted a new Regulation in 
September 2010 that mandates member-states to prepare an emergency plan 
for household consumers in the case of a loss of natural gas supply. "The goal 
of the Regulation is to make sure that every member-state would be in a 
position to survive the loss of its main import source and continue to supply 
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its protected clients, namely household and basic social services, for at least a 
period of 30 days" (Tsakiris, 2010, para. 4).   
 One important point of contention emerged around the breadth of the 
"protected clients" definition.  While Europe's gas industries wanted the 
definition to include industrial customers and electricity producers, the 
definition was only marginally expanded to include small and medium-sized 
enterprises and essential social services, provided they are connected to a gas 
distribution network.  Also, district heating installations that are dependent 
solely on natural gas for operation were included in the protected customers 
(Tsakiris, 2010).   
 As a result, those consumers that would be immediately impacted by a 
disruption in supply would be large industrial users and electricity suppliers.  
While the International Energy Agency estimates that electricity suppliers use 
less than 3% of natural gas as their fuel input, industrial users would be more 
impacted due to the fact that over 30% of their fuel input is natural gas ("2008 
Energy Balance," 2008). 
 In 2006, Ukraine became an observer to the European Union's Energy 
Community Treaty, which establishes a framework for ensuring the stability 
of energy networks and energy security (Energy Community, 2011).  In July 
2010, Ukraine began to align its gas market to European standards and the 
formal accession process began in September 2010.  The Ukrainian 
Parliament adopted the law on Ukrainian accession in December 2010 
(Vichos, 2010).  With the accession process predicted to be completed by 
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early 2011, Ukraine will have a much stronger framework for responding to 
issues of energy security.  As a member, it will be required to adopt the 
Community's acquis communitaire, which includes the aforementioned 
emergency plan regulation ("The Energy Community," 2010).  
 
2e. The Geography and Agriculture of Ukraine 
 
We have spoken at length about Ukraine’s strategic position relative to 
other countries, but let us focus for a moment on the geographical, agricultural, 
and cattle-raising in order to better understand the country as a whole. 
 In Figure 1, we can see that the total geographic area of Ukraine is 
603,700 square kilometers, with a majority of its land mass consisting of 
fertile plains (steppes) and plateaus.  However, the Carpathian Mountains are 
found in the westernmost part of the country and the Dnipro River, which 
traverses the country from north to south, nearly divides the country in half.  
As a result of this large proportion of steppes and plateaus, which are two 
biomes conducive to agriculture, over 56% of Ukraine’s land mass is 
considered arable land (“Ukraine,” 2011).   
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 The climate in Ukraine is also conducive to agricultural production, 
with most of the country having a temperate continental climate.  Only the 
southern Crimean coast has a Mediterranean climate that leads to warmer 
temperatures.  Precipitation is disproportionately distributed, with the most 
being experienced in June and July in the west and north areas of the country 
and the east and southeast receiving considerably less rainfall during these 
months (“Ukraine,” 2011). 
 While under Soviet rule, Ukraine’s agricultural regions were 
aggressively used to produce 20 percent of the grain needs and over 60 
percent of the sugar beet needs of the entire Soviet Union, despite being one 
of the smallest republics, constituting only 2.7% of the total land area of the 
Union.  Soviet influence has continued to this day, as Ukraine’s major 
exported crops continue to be winter wheat, sugar beets, and potatoes.    
There are three main agro-ecological zones of Ukraine (see Figure 2), 
each producing crops most conducive to their soil type and temperate climate.  
Figure 1: Topographic Map of Ukraine  
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Polissya, located in the northern mixed forest zone and constituting 19% of 
Ukraine’s land mass, is the least ploughed part of the territory.  Conditions in 
this zone are suited to many cereals, pulse crops, and potatoes, and traditional 
development of beef-dairy cattle-raising.  The Forest Steppe region, located in 
the central portion of the country and constituting 33% of Ukraine’s land mass, 
has a much higher percentage of ploughed land with approximately 82% of 
the cultivated land within the zone prepared for agriculture.  This zone’s main 
commodity industries are its production of winter wheat and white beets, 
although it is also suited for maize and peas.  The moister northern and north-
west portions also support perennial grasses.  Finally, the southern-most 
Steppe region is the largest region by acreage (making up 40% of the total 
Ukraine land mass).  Large areas of this region (1.2 million hectares) are 
occupied by maize to be used for green fodder and silage.  Its main crops 
include winter wheat and sunflower and the zone also supports cattle and 
sheep-rearing (Bogovin, 2006). 
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Figure 2: Agro-Ecological Zones of Ukraine 
 
 Ukraine’s agricultural production has decreased significantly since the 
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, due to the loss of state subsidies that farmers 
once enjoyed under the previous system.  Land reforms in 1992 freely 
distributed this once state-owned land to private citizens to carry on private 
farming.   The number of farms in the country now totals 40,000, with the 
average farm’s area being 22.6 hectares (ha) which is a unit of measurement 
equal to 10,000 square meters.  Individual ownership of farms has proven 
though to be difficult to maintain profitability.  As a result, the formation of 
co-operatives, agrarian partnerships, and the leasing of land plots have all 
attempted to strengthen farm ownership and create economies of scale. 
 The number of livestock has decreased in Ukraine from over 24 
million heads of cattle in 1990 to 7 million heads of cattle in 2005.  This 
decrease was caused primarily because the majority of these cattle are raised 
on small, private farms which only hold one or two cows.   These small farms 
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do not have the capacity to store and treat any excess milk that these cows 
may produce in order to sell on the open market, and therefore do not have 
any incentive to raise more cows than needed for their own consumption.  
Sheep-rearing has also found popularity in Ukraine, primarily in the Steppe 
zone, where 60% of all sheep are found, although heads of sheep have also 
decreased drastically from 8.4 million in 1990 to 1.9 million in 2006 (Bogovin, 
2006). 
Since 1991, there has been a major shift from the state agricultural 
enterprises popularized during Soviet rule to more entrepreneurial single-
owned farms.  This private ownership is to be expected in a country like 
Ukraine.  When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, with the inflow of new 
ideas and a new system of government came a resurgence of entrepreneurial 
spirit that had been suppressed for decades.  That spirit remains today, as is 
evidenced by recent Eurobarometer data that has found that 50% of 
Ukrainians want to start their own business, higher than the European Union 
average of 45% (“Entrepreneurship,” 2009).  Further statistics serve to 
reinforce this belief, signaled by an exceptional growth in the number of 
private farms, from 2,600 in 1991 to nearly 43,000 in 2010 and continues to 
grow.  In addition, the number of cultivated agricultural land has grown from 
1 million ha in 1991 to 4.2 million ha of land in 2010 (“Agriculture News,” 
2010).   
Rural households also use substantially more natural gas for heating 
than urban households, with annual gas consumption of 2.8 thousand cubic 
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meters (tcm) compared to 1.5 tcm in urban settings (“Household Gas Prices,” 
2006).  For the purposes of this paper, we will assume that rural farmers 
consume 1.5 times the average demand for rural households, due to the fact 
that these farms have a number of secondary buildings that require heating for 
their animal stock and other farm operations.  Despite this high consumption 
of fuel, the average rural farmer has an annual salary of only $3,000 (“Irish 
Farming Links,” 2011).   
 
2f. Long Lines and Shortages: A Time of Resourcefulness 
  
Borovsky describes the Ukrainian people first and foremost as 
“forward-thinking” and people who “make things last” (Borovsky, personal 
communication, November 18, 2010).  He attributes this mentality to a forced 
scarcity that all Ukrainians lived under during Soviet rule, where bread lines 
stretched for blocks and families waited months in order for their lottery 
number to be called for an apartment.  As a result, the Ukrainian culture has 
been defined by this idea of resourcefulness and the country has emerged as a 
particularly strong proponent of environmental measures when they can be 
afforded.  Although much of the industry sectors remain to use outdated 
technology for production due to the cost of this technology and not lack of 
interest, other sectors have begun shifting their business models to include the 
impact their business will have on the environment.  An encouraging example 
is the media sector, where on March 11, 2011, Kyiv Weekly became the first 
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eco-friendly newspaper and now uses recycled paper for all of their printed 
materials (“Kyiv Weekly”).   
 
2g. Summary    
 
 In conclusion, Ukraine has the most energy-intensive economy in the 
world (Pirani, 2007).  Inefficient consumption of cheap gas and an 
overdependence on imported gas are an integral part of this problem and will 
remain so until more energy-efficient measures are implemented.  Russia 
argues that it has provided "humanitarian aid" to Ukraine by subsidizing the 
cost of its natural gas for nearly 20 years, and no longer has any obligation to 
the now-independent country.  Prime Minister Vladimir Putin defiantly 
declared in December 2008 that the "age of cheap gas is over" (“Putin,” 2008).  
Amidst all of the confusion, only one thing is certain: Ukraine must diversify 
its energy inputs or continue to be at the whim of a foreign power.  A 
burgeoning agricultural sector provides opportunity for renewable 
technologies to help achieve this diversification.  However, there appears to 
be a mismatch between the cost of this technology and the average annual 
income of farmers, presenting an opportunity for innovation in the form of 
microfinance. 
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3. Microfinance 
 
3a. Microfinance's Beginnings 
 
 The concept of microfinance is not a new idea.  Traces of 
microfinance can be found in the Irish Loan Fund system, established in the 
early 1700s by author and nationalist Johnathan Swift.  The Fund's purpose 
was to make small loans with interest for short periods, though it did not 
necessarily target the poor and at its peak was making loans to 20% of all Irish 
households annually (“The History,” 2006).   
 Microfinance's focus on the poor was not realized until the emergence 
of formal credit and savings institutions in the late 1800s in Europe.  These 
institutions were motivated by the concern to assist the rural population to 
break out of their dependence on moneylenders and to improve their welfare.  
This primary focus of microfinance institutions remains to this day. 
 In the broadest sense, modern microfinance refers to a movement that 
envisions a world in which low-income households have permanent access to 
a range of high quality financial services to finance their income-producing 
activities, build assets, stabilize consumption, and protect against risks.  The 
traditional microfinance institution (MFI) makes small, short-term, low-
interest loans to an impoverished group of people, who are responsible for 
repaying that loan.  Unlike traditional banks, MFIs do not generally require 
collateral from borrowers, but instead rely upon the social pressures of 
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solidarity lending to enforce repayment.  Borrowers who do not repay are, in 
almost all cases, forbidden from borrowing again from an MFI.   
 Organizations like ACCION and the SEWA Bank (Self-Employed 
Women's Association) were among the first to take up this mission and did so 
by targeting the poorest of the poor in impoverished areas throughout Latin 
America and Africa ("The History," 2006)   
 The traditional microfinance group loan methodology was first 
popularized by the work of Muhammad Yunus during the founding of the 
Grameen Bank, a microfinance institution that was the 2006 recipient of the 
Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to create economic and social development 
amongst the world's poor.  Established in Bangladesh in 1983, the Grameen 
Bank makes use of a lending practice known as solidarity lending.    
In many third-world countries, laws related to secured transactions 
(involving the use of collateral) may be absent or not enforced.  In solidarity 
lending, loans are not given out to individuals, but instead to groups of people, 
using various types of social capital such as peer pressure and mutual support 
to offset the need for collateral.  Psychologists have found that groups of five 
are the ideal size for these groups, as they are small enough to ensure joint 
responsibility and discourage free-riders, but at the same time large enough to 
prevent one person's misfortune from causing the group's collapse (Dowla & 
Burua, 2006). 
 In order to pay the high administrative costs involved with 
microfinancing (as these small loans generate an enormous amount of 
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paperwork and often times require loan officers to travel to isolated areas to 
service customers) interest rates are charged on these loans, sometimes in 
excess of 20% (Fernando, 2006).  Although these customers cannot be offered 
traditional bank loans due to their lack of collateral (and their alternative, loan 
sharks, can charge in excess of 300%), microfinance institutions have 
sometimes been criticized for charging substantially high interest rates that 
appear to contradict their mission.  Microfinance institutions defend their 
critics with the simple, but most widely misunderstood, fact that they are not 
established as charitable institutions but instead as organizations offering the 
poor opportunities that they would not otherwise have so that they may build 
better lives for themselves and their families. 
 
3b. Modern Microfinance Methodology 
 
 From microfinance's humble beginnings has emerged a complex 
product that now offers a wide range of services, including specific 
methodologies for housing, savings, insurance, and credit microfinance.  For 
the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the methodologies behind credit 
microfinance that has itself expanded into various different types of loans.  
ACCION, one of the premier organizations in the world committed to 
building stronger MFIs, believes that, "credit methodology lies at the heart of 
microfinance and its quality is one of the most determinant factors for the 
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efficiency, impact and profitability of an MFI" ("Credit Methodology," para. 
1).   
 Since 1973, ACCION has worked with MFIs to adjust methodological 
innovations to the specific requirements of the institution.  As such, a newly 
formed institution must first consider a number of activities involved in 
lending including sales, client selection, application and approval process, 
repayment monitoring, and delinquency management.   
 ACCION believes that different lending practices, such as the 
aforementioned solidarity lending of Grameen Bank and individual lending do 
not necessarily have to be contradictory but instead can be complementary, as 
long as they fit with the institution's overall business strategy ("Credit 
Methodology," 2011).   
 The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh also uses its own model for its MFI 
operations.  First, it conducts surveys of geographical communities to brief the 
potential for operations in the village, including an evaluation of the village 
population and degree of poverty.  After it has decided upon a suitable village 
that has shown need and infrastructure required for microfinancing, Grameen 
establishes a presence in that village.  A "village center" is created, where the 
borrowers can meet on a weekly basis and repay their loans, while also 
discussing new loan applications and community issues ("Working Method," 
2011).  Meanwhile, groups of borrowers undergo a 5-day training course in 
this center where they are educated on financial products, interest rate 
calculation, and entrepreneurial business skills.   
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3c. Where Does Microfinance Work? 
 
 Microfinance's beginnings in areas such as Bangladesh and South 
America is not a coincidence.  Microfinance functions most effectively in 
third-world countries that have very low standards of living, as very small 
amounts of money can create a real sense of financial viability for 
impoverished people.  In addition, laws and regulations in industrialized 
countries tend to prevent MFIs from being as effective as they would 
otherwise be in an unregulated economy.  As a result, Bangladesh is tied with 
India as being home to the most MFIs (7 each) listed in the top 50 
microfinance institutions in the world (according to Forbes magazine).  
Conversely, none of the top 50 microfinance institutions were established in 
any country within the European Union or in the United States (Swibel, 2007).   
 This is not to say that MFIs cannot be established or function 
effectively in industrialized countries.  Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke, an unlikely ally, spoke in November 2007 at the ACCION Texas 
Summit on Microfinance about the similarities in goals and core values of 
U.S.-based MFIs to those established in third-world countries.  However, 
Bernanke did acknowledge the obvious differences in the operational details 
of U.S. programs in relation to overseas programs, also remarking that "to a 
greater extent than overseas, microfinance programs here have expanded their 
offerings to deliver education, training, and various other services to nascent 
entrepreneurs" (Bernanke, 2007). 
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3d. Case Study: USAID’s Nepal Biogas Microfinance Capacity Building 
Program  
 
  The idea of using microfinancing to raise capital for small-scale 
renewable energy projects has been successfully implemented in many areas 
of the world, most notably in Africa, in Bangladesh through the Grameen 
Shakti program, and in Nepal through an interesting humanitarian partnership. 
 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
United State federal agency primarily responsible for administering civilian 
foreign aid, has recognized the opportunity afforded by microfinance, and as a 
result has implemented the Nepal Biogas Microfinance Capacity Building 
Program (“USAID History,” 2011).  The UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs Division for Sustainable Development recognizes that this 
program “works to ensure that biogas investments are eligible for microcredit 
at affordable interest rates and to facilitate loans through rural based 
microcredit lenders” (“Microcredit for Farmers,” para. 1).  
 USAID has advocated on behalf of microcredit lenders to the Nepalese 
government to raise the limit for microcredit per household from $425 to $725.  
In addition, USAID has provided a substantial amount of loans that have 
leveraged subsequent investment; the program has been successful in not only 
providing the capital but building the policy framework for this project to 
become self-sufficient after an initial period of assistance (“Nepal 
Microcredit,” 2011).   
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 To date, the program has achieved significant results.  According to 
USAID, over 600 biogas plants have been constructed using microcredit, 
benefiting 3,000 people, and mitigating 2,700 tons of carbon dioxide.  
USAID’s initial investment of $81,000 in MFI loans has leveraged over 
$200,000 in total additional investments.  The microfinance institutions in 
Nepal distributing these loans have reported a near 100% repayment rate.    
 
4.  Feasible Small-Scale Renewable Energy Projects 
 
 There are a number of renewable energy technologies currently 
available and feasible that could be implemented in Ukraine in order to 
achieve the desired outcome of this thesis.  However, this section will 
examine the unique advantages afforded by selecting anaerobic digestion as 
the preferred alternative energy source. 
 
4a. Anaerobic Digestion: The Process 
 
 The US Department of Energy defines anaerobic digestion as the 
process by which microorganisms break down biodegradable materials, in the 
absence of oxygen, into several products that can eventually be used for the 
production of electricity or heat, as well as fertilizer (“How Anaerobic 
Digestion,” 2011).  The process begins with bacterial hydrolysis, at which 
time insoluble organic polymers, such as carbohydrates, are broken down to 
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be used by other bacteria.  Acidogenic bacteria then convert these products 
(sugars and amino acids) into carbon dioxide, ammonia, hydrogen, and 
organic acids.  Acetogenic bacteria then convert these organic acids into acetic 
acid and additional carbon dioxide, ammonia, and hydrogen.  Finally, 
methanogens convert these products to methane and carbon dioxide.  See 
Figure 3 for an illustration of this process. 
Digesters can be categorized as either wet or dry systems that are “fed” 
with inputs either continuously or loaded in batches.  In a batch-fed digester, 
waste is fed into the inlet of the plant and the digester is sealed, allowing the 
microorganisms to process the waste and biogas to be produced.  The amount 
of time that the waste must remain in the digester to allow for anaerobic 
digestion to completely occur, also known as its retention rate, varies based on 
the input type.  The time required to complete the anaerobic digestion process 
can vary from ten days (if batch feeding with mostly solids) to eight weeks (if 
continuously feeding with mostly liquids) (Fowler, 2011).   
 
Figure 3: The Three Stages of Anaerobic Digestion 
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 Anaerobic digestion has become a widely-used renewable energy 
source not only because of the availability of its inputs (food waste, animal 
manure, etc.) but also because of the versatility and usability of its products, 
including a rich biogas that can be used as a natural gas substitute and a 
nutrient-rich digestate that can be used as fertilizer.  The methane that is 
produced from this process can be burned to produce both heat and electricity.  
In order to generate the latter, the biogas must be used as a fuel in a 
reciprocating engine or microturbine, a market that General Electric has 
explored extensively in areas of Eastern Europe (“GE Energy,” 2011).  Any 
material that cannot be digested by the microbes constitutes the digestate that 
can be used as a fertilizer to improve soil conditions.  The technology as a 
whole has seen an enormous amount of growth within the last decade.  While 
world anaerobic digestion growth data is unavailable, the Environmental 
Protection Agency estimates that energy production in the United States by 
anaerobic digestion has grown from approximately 15 million kilowatt 
hours/year (kWh/year) equivalent in 2000 to nearly 375 million kWh/year 
equivalent in 2009 (“Anaerobic Digesters Continue,” 2010).    
 Anaerobic digestion in particular benefits from its potential for 
scalability, ability to be implemented almost anywhere in the world, and 
feasibility at almost any size of digester.  Countries such as China have been 
successfully installing small-scale anaerobic digesters for nearly 40 years 
(“Anaerobic Digester,” 2011).  For the remainder of this paper only small-
scale anaerobic digesters will be considered. 
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4b. The Environmental Benefits of Anaerobic Digestion 
 
 A majority of the environmental benefits of anaerobic digesters 
originate from the fact that this biogas serves as a replacement fuel to coal-
based and natural gas resources that generate a significant amount of 
greenhouse gases when produced and when burned.   
 Biogas is unique when one takes into consideration the carbon cycle, 
which, simply put, is the idea that carbon is present in every living thing and 
when that organism dies the carbon is then released into the atmosphere in the 
form of carbon dioxide.  Photosynthetic plants then absorb that carbon dioxide 
in order to grow.  When these plants die, the carbon is then released back into 
the atmosphere and the cycle begins again.   
 Because biogas is synthesized from the carbon that is present in 
biodegradable materials, when the biogas is burned it is simply returning to 
the atmosphere the same carbon that was taken out in the recent past by the 
plants that used it to grow.  When the second byproduct of anaerobic digestion, 
the nutrient-rich digestate, is used as a fertilizer to create more plants that will 
remove more carbon from the atmosphere, the system as a whole becomes 
carbon neutral.  This process stands in stark contrast to the carbon released 
from fossil fuel-burning, which has been sequestered in the earth for millions 
of years, the combustion of which increases the overall levels of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere (“Benefits,” 2011).   
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 In addition, anaerobic digestion processes biodegradable materials that 
would otherwise take up space in a landfill and reduces the amount of 
methane (a greenhouse gas 20 times more powerful than carbon dioxide) that 
would be naturally released into the atmosphere during the natural decay of 
that item.   
 Finally, in countries that collect household waste, the process of waste 
in an on-site digester reduces the amount of transportation that that waste 
would otherwise require to be brought to an incinerator, reducing the 
greenhouse gases associated with vehicle emissions (“Framework,” 2011).   
 
4c. Small-Scale Uses 
 
Besides the availability of their inputs and the value of their outputs, 
anaerobic digestion projects are especially attractive for small-scale 
implementation because of the small amount of capital required to start up a 
plant and the low impact they have on the surrounding environment that might 
otherwise stir up public opposition.  In fact, “anaerobic digestion facilities 
have been recognized by the United Nations Development Programme as one 
of the most useful decentralized sources of energy supply” (Ho, para. 1).  
Decentralization in this instance implies that energy generation is not limited 
to one localized area and then distributed elsewhere, but instead that energy is 
generated in numerous locations throughout a particular geographic area.   
    
 
31 
 
On a household level, the production of biogas also allows for the 
controlled management of animal dung and the safe production of gas for 
cooking, lighting, or power generation.  Although these small-scale projects 
have experienced the most widespread usage China, where it currently holds 
the lead with 15 million households using such technology, these projects 
have been implemented on every continent in the world, except for Antarctica 
(Van Nes, 2006).   
   
4d. Case Study: Moldova Biomass Heating in Rural Communities Project 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), better known to most of the world by its principal update, the 
Kyoto Protocol, has been the primary international document that has 
encouraged the growth of renewable energy projects worldwide since it was 
established in 1992 (“Article 2,” 1992).  Designed in cooperation with the 
Kyoto mechanisms, the Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF) was 
created as a public/private initiative in 2003 to provide carbon finance to the 
poorer nations of the world. 
The Moldova Biomass Project was created in 2005 as a result of this 
framework, which helped to establish funds and an international forum for 
discussing such innovative renewable energy projects.  The focus of this 
project in particular is the installation of individual biogas plants to help 
provide electricity and heat to 120 public buildings throughout the country.  
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The project’s approach takes advantage of the beneficial decentralized energy 
supply of anaerobic digestion, with each project being at least 1 kilometer 
apart and at most 400 kilometers apart.   
In order to implement the project within the country, a new Carbon 
Finance Unit (CFU) was created under the Ministry of Ecology and Natural 
Resources.   The CFU is an independent legal entity that serves as a 
counterpart to the CDCF, and is responsible for negotiating on behalf of each 
individual project the Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA), 
which documents the amount of greenhouse gas emissions that are reduced as 
a result of the project.  They also receive the carbon payments from the CDCF 
and transfer the money to the individual project owners (“Moldova Biomass 
Heating,” 2005).   
 The benefits from this project, of course, are not limited to simply the 
environmental impacts that occur by providing a renewable alternative to the 
conventional coal-burning boilers that create massive air pollution.  In 
addition, this project contributes to sustainable development that has 
reverberating economic and social effects, such as making hot water available 
and affordable in these public buildings and leading to an overall decrease in 
the cost of heat unit production.  These cost savings can allow these schools 
and orphanages to focus their funding on their most precious resource: 
children’s education. 
 
   
    
 
33 
 
4e. The Inputs and the Outputs and Efficiency 
 
Anaerobic digesters typically can accept any biodegradable material.  
This can include waste paper, grass clippings, leftover food, and sewage waste 
just to name a few.  In addition, many facilities have co-digestion capabilities 
that can accommodate two or more types of feedstock that can not only 
process animal waste generated by livestock but also grass or corn that may be 
used as feedstock, for example.   
However, if biogas production is the aim, the “level of putrescibility is 
the key factor in its successful application” and the more putrescible the 
material the higher the yield of gas (“Anaerobic Digestion Feedstock,” para. 
2).  A material is determined to be putrescible if it has high moisture content 
and a sufficient ratio of carbon to nitrogen to allow the anaerobic bacteria to 
convert it biologically and examples can include typical food and kitchen 
waste.  Specially-grown energy crops such as silage can also be used as an 
input for dedicated biogas production. 
As a result, the efficiencies and biogas yields of these inputs can vary 
widely and many studies have been conducted to attempt to calculate these 
yields.  While some anaerobic digesters are able to achieve higher yield 
outputs than others, the following chart illustrates the average yields of 
various inputs. 
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Table 1: Biogas Potential of Various Inputs 
Raw Material Biogas Yield (m³/ dry tonne of raw 
material) 
Cow Manure 60 
Pig Manure 65 
Grain 500-560 
Silage, plant tops, grass algae 400 
Fruit and Sugar Beet Pulp 50-70 
Chicken Dung 130 
Fat 1300 
  
As noted, these yields are measured as the number of cubic meters of 
biogas produced per dry ton of raw material.  While each cubic meter of 
biogas contains the equivalent of 6 kWh of calorific energy, the conversion of 
biogas to electricity is a very inefficient process.  Therefore, only about 2 
kWh of useable electricity is generated from 1 cubic meter of biogas (“Biogas 
FAQ,” 2011).   
However, as mentioned previously, there is another potentially 
valuable output in the form of a digestate that consists of all the indigestible 
materials and dead microorganisms.  The volume of this digestate as an output 
will be approximately 90-95% of the volume of the input that was fed into the 
digester.  Therefore, approximately 1,984 – 2,095 kg of digestate is produced 
from every dry tonne of raw material (“What is Digestate,” 2011)  This 
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digestate can be used as fertilizer at the farm where it was produced to 
increase crop yields and complete the neutral carbon cycle. 
 
5. The Economics of It All 
 
5a.   Input Selection 
 
As mentioned in section 4, digesters can be categorized as either wet 
or dry systems that are “fed” with inputs either continuously or loaded in 
batches.  The retention rate is an important consideration, as it indicates how 
often the system will require labor and maintenance to replace the input.   
A number of different factors should be considered when selecting the 
optimal input for an anaerobic digestion project.  First, the cost of the input 
must be low enough to ensure the borrower can afford or produce it.  In 
addition, it must generate a product that is valued higher than the opportunity 
costs of human consumption of the product.  Second, the input must be easily 
obtainable for the region in which the digesters are being built and the input 
should not be subject to dramatic seasonal changes in production.  Third, the 
calculated biogas yield of the input should be considered to ensure that it is an 
efficient input. 
For this thesis, corn silage was decided upon for its high biogas yield 
and relatively low cost.  Corn silage is defined as a fermented, high-moisture 
fodder that can be fed to livestock as it is high in energy and digestibility.    
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Corn is also one of the primary crops of production in Ukraine, the region in 
which we are studying.  Those qualities, paired with the fact that silage is 
relatively inexpensive when compared with other crop alternatives, make the 
feedstock exceptional for anaerobic digestion.  This input has an approximate 
retention rate of 10 days, indicating that each batch will remain in the plant for 
that duration of time and then will have to be removed and replaced (Steffen, 
1998).   
 
5b.   Construction of the Anaerobic Digester 
 
As mentioned in section 2, the average farmer has an annual natural 
gas demand of approximately 4,200 cubic meters.  From this natural gas 
demand, we can derive the size of the anaerobic digester necessary to annually 
produce that amount of biogas.   
First, we must divide the total amount of biogas produced per year by 
the number of batches per year in order to calculate the biogas produced per 
batch.  Because corn silage has a retention time of 10 days, we can assume 
that there will be 36 batches per year.  Therefore, when we divide 4,200 cubic 
meters by 36 batches, we are left with biogas production per batch of 116.67 
cubic meters. 
Muller and Huttner (2005) have measured corn silage to have a biogas 
yield of 400 cubic meters per metric ton of raw material.  As a result, we can 
divide the biogas production per batch by the yield constant in order to 
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calculate the amount of corn silage required per batch.  When we divide batch 
production of 116.67 cubic meters of biogas by the biogas yield of 400 cubic 
meters, the amount of silage required is found to be .29 metric tons.   
Now that we have calculated the mass of the input that is necessary per 
batch, we can use that mass to calculate the size of the anaerobic digester.  
Kossman (1996) states that the size of the digester should be, on average, 120-
fold the quantity of silage put in daily in order to account for the production 
and expansion of the biogas.  With a retention rate of 10 days, we can 
calculate the daily silage input by dividing the batch size (.29 metric tons) by 
the number of days required for the retention rate (10), which is found to 
be .029 metric tons, or 29 kilograms.  When we multiply this by Kossman’s 
constant of 120, we have found the mass of the digester to be 3480 kg.   
However, anaerobic digesters are measured in terms of volume, not 
mass, and therefore in order to calculate the volume of the digester we must 
first calculate the density of the input (corn silage) that will be placed into this 
digester.     
Dairy One Cooperative has found the density of wet corn silage to be 
43 lbs/cubic foot and the density of dry corn silage to be 14.5 lbs/cubic foot 
(“Master Forage,” 2011).  Because the silage that will be placed into the 
digester is 35% dry matter and 65% wet matter, the calculation is (.65)(43) + 
(.35)(14.5) = 33.025 lbs/cubic foot.  Converting the number into metric units, 
the density of the silage is found to be 15 kg/.028316 cubic meters.  When 
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converted into the density per cubic meter, the density is found to be 
529.74kg/cubic meter.   
Therefore, we can calculate the approximate volume (V) of the 
digester by using the density formula and dividing the mass (M) of the 
digester by the density (D) of the corn silage.   
The density (D) formula:  
 
can be re-written as: 
    
substituting in variables:  
 
 While the volume of the actual digester is calculated to be 6.6 cubic 
meters, the volume of the dome that accompanies the digester must also be 
added to the total volume of the biogas plant, and that is achieved by adding ¼ 
of the volume of the digester.  As a result, the theoretical volume of the 
digester is 8.25 cubic meters. 
 However, actual volume of the digester should be 10% greater than the 
theoretical volume in order to account for gas expansion, and therefore we can 
calculate the actual volume of the digester to be rounded to 9 cubic meters for 
simplicity.     
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The Chinese fixed dome plant structure (see Figure 4) will be used as 
the design model for implementation.  Nearly 7 million of these dome plants 
have been implemented throughout China for nearly 75 years and use the 
seasonal crop wastes from small, rural farms as the primary input.  Dome 
plants in particular have the advantage of being cheap to build and have no 
moving parts or metal parts that can rust.  Also, they are constructed 
underground which saves space, protects the digester from corrosion, and 
makes them less sensitive to seasonal temperature change.  As a result, the 
fixed dome plant is well-regarded for its low maintenance costs.  These dome 
plants also have low fixed installation costs, with costs ranging around $70 
per cubic meter of digester capacity (Kossman, 1996).  Therefore, the 
installation costs of materials would be approximately $630 for our 9 cubic 
meter model.  These costs include the construction of the gasholder, 
digester/slurry storage container, gas appliances/piping, stable modification, 
and general engineering involved with the project (Werner, 1989).  However, 
dome plants have some disadvantages: they often leak some gas, experience 
variant 
pressure 
inside the 
digester, and 
must be 
supervised by 
experienced 
Figure 4:  Chinese Fixed Dome Plant Diagram 
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technicians (Wargert, 2009).      
In addition to the cost of materials, Wargert (2009) estimates that an 
average of 9 man hours per cubic meter of digester capacity must be used to 
construct the plant.  For the purposes of this thesis, we will assume an hourly 
wage of $5 per hour which is substantially higher than the average hourly 
wage in Ukraine, but the project will be awarded as a limited contract and 
therefore would command a higher wage.  Therefore, total labor costs of 
installation (81 hours multiplied by $5) will total $405.  When added to the 
cost of materials, the total installation costs will amount to approximately 
$1035.   
 
5c.   Maintaining the Digester 
 
In addition to the fixed costs of installation of the biogas plant, there 
are also a number of operating costs that result from the maintenance and 
operation of the plant.  Annual maintenance costs (such as materials for 
repairs) have been estimated at approximately 3% of the digester system 
turnkey cost, equating to annual costs of approximately $31.05 (Werner, 
1989).   
As a result, an additional variable cost related to operation will result 
from the pumping, repairs, cleaning, and monitoring of the plant.  Iowa State 
University has estimated the annual labor required for the operation of the 
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digestion system to be approximately 44.34 man hours, amounting to annual 
labor costs of $221.70 (Ernst & Rodecker, 1999). 
 
5d.   Corn Silage as a Cost Factor  
  
 Low-cost corn silage can be made from every part of the corn plant, 
including the stalk, by placing large amounts of the silage into heaps and then 
rolling over the heap with a tractor or other large piece of machinery to push 
out the air.  The heap is then covered in a plastic cover held down by tires or 
other heavy objects.  This high-moisture feedstock is then fed into the digester 
once every 10 days. 
 At the present time, there is no standard practice for establishing a 
valuation method for corn silage because of its very nature of not being easily 
transportable and the fact that it is often regarded as “waste” because it is not 
fit for human consumption.  Therefore, there is no market price of corn silage.  
The relevant cost of the input is in fact the opportunity cost of what the silage 
could otherwise be used for.  However, Purdue University has taken a very 
methodical concept at attempting to value corn silage that I have utilized for 
my thesis (Hendrix, 2002).   
The concept uses a number of equations and seeks to isolate the 
amount of dry grain that is present in a quantity of the semi-liquid corn silage.  
Once the quantity of this grain is found in pounds, it must then be converted 
into pounds of no. 2 corn (a label which denotes the standard corn product on 
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the world market), which is achieved by dividing the number of pounds of 
grain by a factor.  This quantity of no. 2 corn (in pounds) must then be 
converted into bushels (as the world market prices grain by the bushel).  It is 
now possible to value the corn silage by multiplying the number of bushels of 
no. 2 corn by the market bushel no. 2 corn price for Ukraine.   
“First, the method assumes that the dry matter of whole plant corn 
silage contains 50% grain.  We’ll assume that moisture content of the silage 
has been checked and found to be 65%.  Therefore, dry matter content is 
35%” (Hendrix, para. 5).  To determine the amount of dry matter per tonne, 
we simply determine 35% of 2204 lbs, which equates to 771.4 lbs.  Because 
only 50% of that dry matter is grain, we must only compute the price for half 
of that dry matter, which is 385.7 lbs.  We then divide by a factor of .845 in 
order to convert our grain into no. 2 corn, which is equal to 456.5 lbs of no. 2 
corn.  In order to find the number of bushels, we must divide our total by 56 
lbs, because there are 56 lbs of no. 2 corn in a bushel.  We are then left with 
8.15 bushels.  According to a recent article in Agro Perspectiva (2011), the 
current market price of one bushel of Ukrainian no. 2 corn is $5.92 
(“Ukrainian Grain Market,” 2011).  As a result, this leaves us with an 
estimation of $48.25 per tonne of corn silage.  However, we must also 
consider the cost of the fertilizer, harvesting, and storing of silage.  Purdue 
University has proposed a value of $1.00 per 100 lb. of silage dry matter per 
metric ton (in this case 771 lbs), resulting in an additional cost of $7.71.  
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Therefore, our final estimation for the cost of corn silage per metric ton is 
$55.96.   
If we then multiply the batch size (.29 metric tons) by the 
aforementioned price of corn silage per metric ton ($55.96) we find that our 
input cost per batch will be $16.12.  Because corn silage has a retention rate of 
10 days, there will be approximately 36 batches each year amounting to a total 
annual cost for inputs of $580.19.   
If we combine the annual costs for inputs ($580.19) with the annual 
costs for operation ($221.07) and maintenance ($31.05), we are left with total 
annual costs of approximately $832.94. 
 
5e.   Revenues  
 
 There are two byproducts of anaerobic digestion, one of which has real, 
significant value associated with it and the second of which has a usable value 
to the farmers themselves but little value in the open market.  The first 
byproduct, a biogas that is 80% methane can be burned on-site for heat or 
cooking purposes, but in order to value the byproduct as a natural gas 
equivalent the amount of biogas must be multiplied by .80 in order to 
determine the amount of pure methane.  This methane has a fluctuating value 
that is influenced by the price of oil and whose price has risen sharply in 
recent years.  Secondly, the undigested anaerobic waste that is produced 
during the process can serve as an organic alternative for fertilizer on the 
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producer’s land, but is not easily transportable and cannot easily be sold.  The 
opportunity costs of being able to reduce the amount of fertilizer purchased by 
the farmer could also be calculated as a cost savings to the user.  The most 
important use of this fertilizer, though, would be ensuring that it is used to 
produce more corn at the farm it was created to complete the carbon neutrality 
of the system.    
In addition, because of the nature of anaerobic digestion as a means of 
reducing greenhouse gases, these digesters will also generate renewable 
energy credits, which can be sold on an international market and will be 
discussed in further detail in section 7.  
Using the batch size calculated from the previous section, we can 
determine the amount of biogas produced from one batch by multiplying the 
batch size (.29 metric tons) by the biogas yield (400 cubic meters), which 
equates to 115 cubic meters of biogas production per batch.  The biogas that is 
produced is only 80% methane and 20% carbon dioxide and other undesirable 
compounds.  The amount of biogas that is produced annually can be 
determined by multiplying the production per batch (115 cubic meters) by the 
number of batches (36), which equals 4147.2 cubic meters.  However, in order 
to calculate the revenues using the price of natural gas (which is 100% 
methane) we must then multiply the 115 cubic meters by .8 in order to 
determine the total cubic meters of methane produced per batch.  Doing so, 
we find that 92.2 cubic meters of methane are produced. 
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In order to find the annual biogas production we must multiply the 
methane produced per batch (92.2 cubic meters) by the number of batches 
(36), which equates to 3317.8 cubic meters per year. 
   The price of imported natural gas for Ukraine has increased 
significantly within the past few years, and the year 2011 is no exception.  
Naftogaz, the state-owned Ukrainian gas company, recently announced a 
6.1% increase in price for the second quarter of 2011 to a price of $280 per 
thousand cubic meters (“Price of Imported,” 2011).  Therefore, the total 
annual revenue generated from biogas production can be calculated by 
multiplying the annual biomethane output (3.3 thousand cubic meters per year) 
by the price of natural gas ($280 per thousand cubic meters) which totals 
$928.97 per year. 
 
5f.   Profits 
 
 The traditional, simple definition of profit is explained as revenues 
minus total costs.  As a result, in order to calculate profit we must use the 
aforementioned revenues generated from the methane and subtract from it the 
annual costs of maintenance, operation, and input.  Doing so, we can calculate 
the annual profits for three digester sizes (see Table 2).  These profit 
calculations do not take into consideration the cost of installation, instead 
illustrating annual profits for each year after year 1.     
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Table 2: Annual Profits to Borrowers  
Size of Digester 7 m3 9m3 11m3 
Total Annual Value of Methane 
Output $722.53 $928.97 $1,135.41 
Total Annual Costs of Operation $687.66 $832.94 $953.93 
Total Annual Profit  $34.87 $96.03 $181.49 
 
5g.   Net Present Values 
  
While profits measure the amount of money that the project will 
generate each year, it does not take into account the discounted value of 
money over the lifespan of the project and also does not take into account the 
initial installation costs (IC) that the project must recover in order to be a 
viable project and have a positive value over the life of the project.  It takes 
into account revenue (R), variable costs (VC), the discount rate (D), and the 
lifespan of the project in years (n). 
 
The net present value (NPV) formula can be written as such: 
 
 
 While we have previously calculated installation costs, revenue, and 
variable costs, there are other variables that have not yet been quantified, 
namely lifespan of the project and the discount rate.  Puxin is a popular 
Chinese company that produces a small scale biogas plant that states that the 
    
 
47 
 
lifespan of a small-scale biogas plant is 30 years (“30 years lifespan,” 2011).  
In addition, a discount rate of 5% was used for this analysis.   
 Substituting in the values that I have determined for a 9 cubic meter 
biogas plant project, we find the net present value to be:  
 
   
 
 
 
 In Figure 5, we evaluate how the size of the digester influences the 
NPV and we see that NPV is positive when digester is larger than 8 cubic 
meters.
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Figure 5: Net Present Value of Anaerobic Digesters 
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6. Implementation of MFI in Ukraine under Proposed Plan 
 
  
This section seeks to apply the aforementioned concepts of 
microfinance and small-scale biogas plants into the creation of a functioning 
microfinance institution that could be implemented and succeed in the country 
of Ukraine.  This institution will be called Zapravky Maybutnye Ukraïni 
(ZMU), which is Ukrainian for “Fueling Ukraine’s Future.”  The name of this 
institution has a two-pronged meaning, as it not only refers to the future 
production of the actual fuel in the form of biogas, but can also be interpreted 
as an institution that is investing in technology and people that will become a 
larger part of Ukraine’s portfolio in the future. 
Throughout the section, I will reintroduce unique elements of 
Ukraine’s political and geographic climate that would necessitate the 
alteration of traditional techniques in both of these concepts.  At the end of the 
section, I will describe the operation of the institution and the borrowing 
process.  In addition, I will conduct a 20-year financial analysis for the 
borrowers for the institution itself.   
 
6a.   The Target Population 
 
 As described in section 2, the natural gas demand of rural households, 
and especially farmers, is considerably higher than their urban counterparts.  
In fact, assuming that farm operations require 1.5 times as much natural gas as 
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an average rural household, with a natural gas price of $280 per thousand 
cubic meters, the annual farmer spends an incredible 39% of their annual 
income on heating costs alone!   
These individual farms, with an average land size of 60 ha (148 acres), 
with existing infrastructure for the production of corn silage (as corn is one of 
the most-produced crops in the country and is used as a feedstock), and having 
an exceptionally high heating burden makes this group the optimal target 
population for an institution such as this.      
The requirements for access to loans from this institution would 
initially be geographic and income-based.  All borrowers must be located 
within 150 miles of a branch to ensure proximity and must have an income of 
at least $2,000 a year. 
  
 6b.   The Framework and Regulation of a Microfinance Institution in Ukraine 
  
Currently, there are only two functioning microfinance institutions in 
Ukraine: ProCredit Bank Ukraine and Nadia Ukrainy.  It is difficult because 
there are very few “best practices” that have been designed specifically for 
Ukrainian institutions.  However, the two institutions alone have a total of 
nearly 28,000 borrowers with total assets of $349 million and provide an 
exciting outlook and opportunity for microfinance in Ukraine (“Microfinance 
in Ukraine,” 2011).   
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 ProCredit Bank Ukraine, the larger of the two institutions, is a 
development-oriented full-service bank.  While it extends millions of dollars 
in loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, it generally appeals to larger 
businesses and the average loan size is over $10,000, well above what this 
institution would be targeting. 
 Nadia Ukrainy, the smaller of the two institutions, and the structure 
that this microfinance institution will be modeled after, is a non-banking 
financial institution that is a branch of the larger HOPE International network 
which works in 14 different countries.  Extending non-collateralized loans for 
microenterprises, agriculture, and housing, Nadia Ukrainy prides itself on the 
transparency of its interest charges, fees, and penalties (“Nadia Ukrainy,” 
2011).  This particular commitment to client protection is necessary in a 
country such as Ukraine, where corruption especially in the financial sector 
has cast a negative light on the trustworthiness of such institutions.  This 
institution’s average size loan extended to borrowers is only $620 and has 
total assets of $2.6 million (“Microfinance in Ukraine,” 2011).   
 These non-banking financial institutions (NBFI) provide banking 
functions without meeting the legal definition of a bank and therefore cannot 
take customer’s deposits.  However, they can provide loans and credit 
facilities from other sources of funding, such as venture capitalists.  NBFIs in 
Ukraine also have low minimum capital requirements of $440,000, which is 
considerably lower than the world average of $7.3 million (Noel, 2006). In the 
case of Nadia Ukrainy, the NBFI works with a number of different partners 
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like the Polish-based Microfinance Centre for network affiliation and with 
Kiva as the source of external private-citizen funding.   
Prior to 2003, there were no regulatory agencies in Ukraine to oversee 
operations of these 
NBFIs and as a 
result many were 
established and 
began to engage in 
money 
misappropriation activities.  Since this time, the State Commission for 
Regulation of Financial Services Markets of Ukraine has adopted a legal 
framework for the regulation of these institutions that has discouraged many 
of these inappropriate institutions from pursuing business in Ukraine, 
increasing the opportunity to gain market share in the country.  
 
6c.   Operation and Structure of the Microfinance Institution 
 
One of the principles of microfinance is the proximity of the branches 
to the people who are being served.  This close proximity not only ensures 
that loan agents can keep a close watch on those who are receiving these loans, 
but more importantly it helps to establish a positive public relations image of 
immersing the institution into the community.  Employing local citizens also 
Figure 6: Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Highlighted on Map of Ukraine 
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establishes a firm trust with the surrounding community.  This trust is 
imperative to ensuring the success of the organization. 
Because the target population of this microfinance institution is rural 
farmers, it is important to situate the founding branch in an area of Ukraine 
that would not only be conducive to farming, but also have a large rural 
population.  After extensive research, the Dnipropetrovsk oblast (see Figure 6) 
was selected as the location for the pilot program of this institution because of 
its location in the southeastern steppe ecological zone, which is home to 
Ukraine’s most arable land and has a rural population of over 600,000 people 
(Rowland, 2004).  This centralized administrative office would serve as the 
institution’s headquarters and would administer the institution’s first loans.  A 
timeline for expansion will be explained later in this section. 
This administrative office would originally be staffed with one loan 
officer selected from the local population, whose responsibilities would be to 
appeal to rural farmers via phone and in-person presentations where the 
officers would describe exactly how the institution works and the benefits of 
anaerobic digestion.  In addition, loan officers would conduct initial training 
sessions for borrowers until other staff was hired.  The loan officers would be 
given a base salary and benefits with opportunities for commission-based 
bonuses once borrowers that they had recruited repaid their lease in full, 
providing motivation for loan officers to encourage repayment.  An 
engineering professional would also be hired on staff and would be 
responsible for working within the established budget to contract laborers on a 
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per-project basis to travel to the farms, construct the anaerobic digesters, and 
also service broken digesters.    
As the institution expanded (a timeline can be found at the end of this 
section), additional laborers would be hired to ease in the operation of the 
branch.  For example, a training officer would be hired to train borrowers on 
the basics of how their loan works, how the institution functions, and how to 
operate and maintain their digester.  This training officer would also initially 
serve as the human resources representative as expansion necessitated hiring 
of new personnel.  One branch manager would also be hired to oversee the 
operations of the branch and ensure that all responsibilities were being 
completed.  One bookkeeper, whose sole responsibility would be to track and 
report the number and amount of loans that were disbursed, would be hired as 
well. 
 
6d.   Loan Structure  
 
 When the institution is first created, only one loan product will be 
offered: a one-time lease of an anaerobic digester completely installed by the 
institution, with a value of $1035.  The lease would include a servicing charge 
of $100 that would help to cover the costs of implementing the loan.  As a 
result, the lease’s total value would be $1135.  This amount, which is 
approximately 53% of Ukraine’s gross national income per capita, can be 
serviced easily and optimally by traditional microfinancing.  
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As the institution begins to expand and increases the number of 
borrowers, other loan products will be introduced.  Seasonal loans are often 
required by farmers in order to purchase seeds and equipment necessary to 
grow crops.  The need arises because of a mismatch of when they need money 
(in early spring when they plant the crops) and when they have money (in the 
fall after they have harvested and sold crops).    
While microfinance is built on the foundation that a loan term should 
be kept short and repayment should be often, it is also important to ensure that 
the borrower has the ability and capacity to repay the loan within the defined 
term limit.  As a result, borrowers will repay their loans monthly over the 
course of five years to encourage consistent savings and to ensure that the 
amount due for repayment is small and never burdensome.   
Before we can calculate annual payments (A), we must first calculate 
the present value of the lease ( ), where r equals 5%.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
This annual lease repayment of $262.12 (or $21.84 monthly) would be 
a cost to the farmer for the first five years of having the digester.   
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In addition, the farmer would also be responsible for the cost of 
purchasing or manufacturing the corn silage that will be used as an input, with 
an annual cost of $580.19 each year over the entire lifetime of the digester.  
Also, operation and maintenance would be the responsibility of the borrower, 
estimated in section 5 at an annual cost of $31.05.  Finally, we assume for the 
purpose of this thesis that the rural farmer would be willing and able to 
complete the annual labor (44 hours) required to feed inputs into the digester 
and periodically clean the structure. 
During this time, the effective cost of fuel decreases from $280 per 
thousand cubic meters (39% of average farmers’ income) to $140 per  
thousand cubic meters (19.5% of their income) as biogas replaces their 
imported natural gas.  When we multiply the cost savings by the natural gas 
usage of the farmer, we find that it would result in a first-year fuel cost 
savings of $588 for the farmer.   
Because the term of the loan is extended over a five year period, these 
farmers would begin to experience positive profits of $55.61 beginning in year 
1 and continuing through year 5, as the lease repayment, silage cost, and 
operation and maintenance costs total $873.36 and the value of the biogas is 
$928.97.  When the lease has been repaid in full beginning at year 5, the 
annual profits will increase to $317.73 a year for the remainder of the 
digester’s lifespan, as the borrower no longer has the repayment cost so their 
annual costs decrease to $611.24 and revenues remain constant at $928.97 
(see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Timeline of Profits to Borrowers 
 
The structure of the loans that would be given to borrowers would be 
based on a modified principle of solidarity lending, which was introduced in 
section 3.  This principle believes that in order to provide non-collateralized 
loans, borrowers must organize themselves into groups of five in order to tap 
into the social capital of reliability and responsibility.  While true solidarity 
lending will lend to the group as a whole and not to individuals, the logistics 
of providing digesters obviously makes this impossible.  This modified 
solidarity lending practice states that in order for the second person to receive 
his or her loan, the first borrower must have attended all of the training 
courses necessary to receive the loan and begun the repayment process.  In 
addition, each loan amount for each borrower must be approved by the entire 
group, ensuring that each group member is aware and involved in the process.   
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In order for the second borrower to receive his or her loan, the first 
borrower must have begun the repayment process and paid their first month’s 
lease.  If at any point an earlier borrower does not repay their loan, the entire 
group will be held responsible to help repay the loan of the delinquent 
borrower in order to continue the lending process. 
This process continues onto the third, fourth, and fifth borrower and 
the lack of repayment of even one borrower can significantly hinder the loan 
process of all other borrowers in his or her group.  This “solidarity” is able to 
leverage social capital to serve as the collateral generally needed for access to 
capital.  The borrowing cycle does not end with the fifth borrower, however.  
In order for the first borrower to be eligible for the aforementioned seasonal 
loans and other additional loans that will be offered by the institution, the 
borrowing cycle must have been successfully completed and all five 
borrowers must be active in the repayment process (see Figure 8).  While non-
repayment is an issue that all microfinance institutions must account for, this 
institution is unique in the fact that the borrowers are not as mobile or likely to 
flee with unpaid loans because the farmers own large pieces of property with 
farm equipment and can easily be tracked down, preventing exploitation of the 
process.  In addition, the cost savings and revenue from these digesters are 
reliable and certain.  As a result, the repayment process will not be dependable 
on the success of an uncertain entrepreneurial venture, as is the case in many 
of the impoverished countries where microfinance exists.  
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Figure 8: Institution's Borrower Cycle 
 
6e.   Portal for Funding 
 
 In the beginning of the institution, a heavy focus will be put on 
attracting angel investors and forward-thinking venture capitalists that would 
lend money to the institution (at a low or no interest rate) in order to be able to 
provide the first loans to be made to borrowers.  This appeal is necessary 
because these non-banking financial institutions cannot accept deposits like a 
traditional bank 
 Once the institution has matured and established itself, a working 
partnership will be created with organizations that appeal to private citizens to 
give up the use of their capital for a period of time (generally around 6 months) 
so that the microfinance institution may use it for loans.  The most popular of 
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all of these organizations is a web-based funding portal called Kiva, who 
works with a number of field partners all across the world to showcase to 
philanthropic-minded citizens the stories of real, impoverished entrepreneurs 
in other countries that desperately need assistance.  On the website, each 
entrepreneur has a picture and a stated goal of how much funding he or she 
needs to implement the project that they are proposing.  The citizen can then 
pledge a certain amount of money through the website to help this 
entrepreneur achieve their goal, and the person at that time then “lends” their 
money to Kiva at a 0% interest rate, who then disburses these funds to a field 
partner to actually implement the loan.  The field partner then collects the 
repayment of this loan over the following months and then repays Kiva.  The 
original lender is generally repaid within 5-6 months.  Therefore, the person 
can then “recycle” their pledge a countless number of times and can request a 
reimbursement of that pledge as long as they have been repaid their loan.  For 
an illustrative example of the process, see Figure 9 below.  Kiva boasts a 
98.65% repayment rate and therefore there is little actual risk to the lender of 
losing their loan (“About Us,” 2011).   
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Figure 9: Kiva Loan Cycle 
 
Kiva works in close partnership with over 130 field partners 
(microfinance institutions) around the world in order to implement these loans.  
There are strict requirements for becoming a field partner, including having an 
active portfolio of at least 1,000 borrowers, having a history of at least 2-3 
years of  lending, be registered as a legal entity in the country of origin, and 
having at least 1 year of financial audits.  However, the benefits include a 0% 
interest debt capital, a short time period (1 week) required to pilot the program, 
low administrative costs of less than 1% as a factor of capital raised, and 
improved staff morale. 
 The process of posting borrower information onto the Kiva website 
would fall onto the responsibility of the loan officers, who would take 
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photographs of the farmers, translate their background stories, and upload the 
images onto the website.    
 As seen above, this strategy of raising capital could only be 
implemented as the microfinance institution matured and achieved the goals 
required to become a Kiva field partner.  Before these goals were reached, the 
institution would seek angel investors and philanthropic contributions in order 
to initially provide loans.  For the purpose of this paper, we assume 
philanthropic investors loan capital to the institution at a 0% interest rate.     
  
6f.   Costs of the Institution 
 
“Microfinance is a high touch, high cost business,” says Adrian 
Gonzalez of the Microfinance Information Exchange.  Operating expenses 
represent 62 percent of the interest rate that is charged to borrowers and 
includes a number of costs borne by the institution.  These costs are a result of 
the institution’s focus, as it is much more expensive to disburse (100) $1,000 
loans that it is to disburse one $100,000 loan.  The administrative costs of 
processing the high number of applications, the physical time spent traveling 
and visiting with borrowers, the costs of training materials to conduct training 
seminars, and the operation of a large number of branches necessitated by the 
need for being close to borrowers all contribute to this high cost of operation.  
Because some of these costs (rent, salaries, training seminars that can 
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accommodate hundreds of borrowers) are fixed costs, the smaller the amount 
of loans and the smaller the institution, the higher the cost of doing business.   
In order to eventually achieve financial self-sufficiency, the 
microfinance institution must pass these costs onto the borrowers in the form 
of fees on their loans.  Critics complain that many institutions charge fees that 
are as high, if not higher, than the poor person’s alternative: moneylenders.  
However, this institution would be able to keep operating costs low because 
the loan amount is considerably high and specialization of job duties within 
the institution would ensure efficiency.  In addition, by at first offering only 
one product to borrowers, it would reduce the variable costs of being trained 
and servicing many different products. 
Obviously the largest cost to the microfinance institution is the fact 
that there is a mismatch of cash flows, as they are required to pay for the cost 
of installing the digester in a lump sum; however they don’t fully recover 
those costs from the farmers until 5 years later.  That is why it is so important 
to first find investors that would be willing to lend the use of their capital 
during this time.   
In addition, like all businesses, microfinance institutions have normal 
operation costs that are fixed.  For instance, the wages of salaried employees 
would cost the institution approximately $280 per month per employee hired.  
The cost of renting space in an office building in the Dnipropetrovsk region 
will cost the institution approximately $500 per month.  Utilities such as water, 
heat, phone service, and internet will cost the institution a further $100 per 
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month.  Original investments in office equipment like computers and fax 
machines will result in a cost of approximately $1000 per month for the first 
year. After the first year, the cost will drop to $300 per month for the 
remaining years, as the costs shift to less expensive training materials and 
other accessory expenses.  Finally, the World Bank completed a study in June 
2010 that found that the filing expenses of creating a business in Ukraine 
(opening a bank account, registration fees, and preparing a company seal) 
totaled a one-time fee of $136 that would be paid in the first year (“Starting a 
Business,” 2010).  
  
6g.   Expansion Timeline 
 
 The institution aims to have consistent growth as it expands in new 
loans, total loans outstanding, and total operating branches to distribute these 
loans.  In year one, the institution’s first branch office will be established and 
will begin to disburse loans with a staff of two employees, one loan officer to 
establish a client base and one engineer to coordinate the construction of the 
digesters.  In the first years, exponential growth of new loans would be 
expected and the number of staff would increase exponentially as well.  The 
exponential growth of the institution would also translate into high costs that 
would not be able to be covered by the small amounts of revenue being 
generated from the repayment of the loans.  As a result, the institution would 
rely on external financing and not be financially self-sustainable until year 6.  
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The institution would achieve a number of milestones during this time, 
distributing its 100th loan approximately 1 year after it gave out its first.  In 
addition, the institution would qualify to become a Kiva partner 
approximately 3 years after its creation when it distributes its 1000th loan.  At 
that point, it would generate significant interest and publicity from national 
media outlets, as well as begin receiving capital through Kiva, that would 
cause an increase in the number of new loans it disbursed during the third year.   
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Figure 10: Timeline of Microfinance Institution Growth 
 In the fifth year after its creation, the institution would open a second 
branch elsewhere in Ukraine (see Figure 10 for the full timeline) in order to 
accommodate more rural farmers that would increase the institution’s cost of 
labor, rent, utilities, and office equipment, but would undoubtedly provide a 
much larger target population for the institution.   
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In year 6, the institution would have matured into a stable organization 
that would see continued, steady growth.  In addition, the number of 
outstanding loans (those which are being repaid to the institution) would also 
be high enough at this point to allow the institution to become financially self-
sustainable and post a modest profit in that year of approximately $400,000.  
The microfinance institution would actually experience for the first time a 
decrease in the number of new loans disbursed that year, as saturation of the 
target population begins to occur.  This decrease will continue until a new 
branch is constructed, which would occur once every four years under the 
linear growth model.  At that point, the number of new loans would become 
cyclical, decreasing until a new branch was opened at which point the number 
would begin to increase again, and so on.  The number of new staff hired by 
the institution would increase by 2 each year, except in those years where a 
new branch was opened, when the number of new staff would increase by 3.   
 As a result of this linear growth, at year 10 the number of new loans 
issued each year would begin to level out to approximately 1,800 per year (see 
Figure 11).  Beginning in year 13, the total numbers of loans outstanding at 
any point in time would be approximately 8,900  (see Figure 12) and annual 
profits of the institution would remain constant at approximately $1.1 million.  
The first generation of the digesters built would continue until year 30, at 
which point those digesters that were built in the first year would begin to be 
phased out.  At this point in year 30, nearly 51,000 digesters would have been 
built and in operation (see Figure 13 for an illustration of this digester growth).  
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Finally, see Appendix B for a full analysis of costs and revenues of this 
institution.    
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Figure 11: New Loan Growth 
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Figure 12: Projected Outstanding Loan Growth 
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7. Results 
 
7a.   The Environmental Benefits to This Institution 
  
 As mentioned in section 3, anaerobic digesters are carbon neutral and 
thus their greenhouse gas reduction comes as a result of offsetting the 
emissions that would have been produced had the farm instead used a fossil 
fuel-based natural gas.  In order to calculate these offset emissions, we must 
determine the amount of greenhouse gases that would have been released into 
the atmosphere from burning 3,317 cubic meters of natural gas annually (the 
amount of methane produced per digester from section 5).   
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 First, we must calculate the heat content of the methane that is 
produced.  A table located on the website The Engineering Tool Box has 
found the net heating value of methane to be 910 British thermal units 
(Btu)/ft3.  In order to convert this value into cubic meters, we must multiply 
the number by a factor of 35.315.  As a result, we find that the heat content 
per cubic meter is (910)(35.315) = 32,317 Btu/m3.  When we multiply this 
number by the amount of cubic meters of methane produced annually (3,317) 
we find that annual heat content of each digester is approximately 106.597 
million Btu.   
 Second, we must calculate the amount of CO2 that is emitted from the 
generation of this amount of heat.  The Department of Energy has determine 
that 117.080 lbs of CO2 is produced per million Btu from methane.  In order 
to convert this number into the metric system, we must first multiply 117.080 
lb by .454 kg/lb to find that 53.2 kg of CO2 is produced per million Btu.   
 Finally, we must multiply the amount of Btu generated from each 
digester by its CO2 production constant.  Doing so, we find that (106.597 
million Btu)(53.2e kg/million Btu) = 5671 kg.  Converting this into metric 
tons, we find that each anaerobic digester offsets 5.67 metric tons of CO2 
annually.   
 Aggregating all of the digesters, we can easily calculate the total 
amount of CO2 that is offset annually from constructing these digesters.  In 
year 1, total carbon offsets will amount to 567 metric tons and will continue to 
grow annually.  For example, in year 30 when 51,000 digesters are in 
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operation there will be a carbon offset of over 260,000 metric tons annually 
(see Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Projected Carbon Dioxide Offset Growth 
 
7b.   Carbon Trading: The Financial Benefits to Anaerobic Digestion 
 
The UNFCCC has succeeded in transforming international 
environmental policy in the last decade in such a way that it has created an 
enormous number of financial incentives to implementing such renewable 
energy projects like anaerobic digestion.  The foundation of the Kyoto 
Protocol has committed signatory countries to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions by a particular percentage in relation to a benchmark year that has 
been selected.  Although this commitment encourages countries to begin the 
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construction of renewable energy projects within their borders, the protocol 
also allows for countries to engage in international transactions in order to 
gain other emission reductions, operating on the principle that reductions in 
carbon emissions anywhere have the same impact on our shared atmosphere.   
The most exciting of these new incentives involves the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), which was created under Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which created a carbon trading market where developed 
countries could purchase Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from 
underdeveloped countries.  These CERs are, in effect, certificates stating that 
projects conducted in these underdeveloped countries were proven to have 
reduced exactly 1 tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (“Emission Reductions 
Unit,” 2011). 
These CERs are traded on the European Climate Exchange (ECX), 
which functions much like a stock market where buyers (in this case 
companies and private individuals) purchase enough CERs from sellers 
(brokers) in order to come into compliance with their respective goals or 
mandates for emissions reductions.    
While CERs are generated from projects that originate in 
underdeveloped countries, there are also Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) 
that are generated from projects implemented in developed countries under the 
Joint Implementation mechanism, where developed nations can purchase 
emissions reductions from other developed nations.  Ukraine is considered a 
developed nation under the Kyoto Protocol and therefore any offsets 
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originating from projects in this country would generate ERUs.  These ERUs 
have just recently begun to be traded on the ECX and Ukraine has emerged as 
the largest issuance of these certificates to date.    
There is some precedent established for JI projects that in fact generate 
these ERUs for sale.  The Palhalma Biogas Plant, a digester located at a 
meatpacking plant in Hungary, was recently brought online in 2008 and 
generates over 37,000 ERUs a year that it then sells on the ERU market 
(“Palhalma Biogas Plant,” 2011).   
The most recent data from the European Climate Exchange values 
June 2011 future contracts of ERUs at $18.74/metric ton of carbon emission 
reduction. 
As a result, once the institution has matured there is real and 
significant opportunity for this institution to couple together the offsets 
achieved from its thousands of anaerobic digesters and to sell these ERUs on 
the ECX.  In year 30, the annual value of these ERUs could reach nearly $5.5 
million (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Projected Annual Value of ERUs 
 
7c.   The Effects on Natural Gas Imports from this Institution 
  
Finally, it is important to calculate the impact that this institution is 
having on the amount of natural gas that is imported to Ukraine each year.  As 
mentioned, approximately 75% of Ukraine’s natural gas usage (60 billion 
cubic meters) is imported from Russia and Turkmenistan each year.   
 As found in section 5, each anaerobic digester produces 3,300 cubic 
meters of methane per year.  In order to calculate the total amount of natural 
gas produced each year, we simply multiply 3,300 by the number of digesters.  
As a result, we find that while in year 1 there is a total annual natural gas 
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production of only 330,000 cubic meters, by year 30 the total annual 
production has grown to 168.3 million cubic meters.  While this number 
represents only .3% of Ukraine’s annual natural gas imports, it would amount 
to a very significant increase in the amount of renewable energy as a portion 
of the country's energy production (see Figure 16).  
  
 
0
20000000
40000000
60000000
80000000
100000000
120000000
0 5 10 15 20
M
et
ha
n
e 
Pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
(m
3)
Year 
Annual Total Methane Production From 
Digesters
 
Figure 16: Projected Methane Production from Digesters 
 
7d.   Summary 
 
 In conclusion, the promise and potential for renewable energy is not 
simply welcomed, it is absolutely imperative in order for Ukraine to prevent a 
natural gas conflict that could have repercussions for decades to come.  While 
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the costs of natural gas are only increasing, the costs of renewable 
technologies are decreasing substantially due to producers achieving 
economies of scale and new research increasing efficiency.  Anaerobic 
digestion proves particularly promising as it is a low-cost, highly efficient 
process that could be implemented in Ukraine.  Rather than force the burden 
of a large lump sum payment on poor, rural farmers, it has been shown that it 
is financially feasible to create a microfinance institution that would lease 
these digesters and allow farmers to repay loans over a 5-year time period.  
The environmental, financial, and societal impacts that this project could have 
would reverberate across the world.  It would fuel Ukraine’s future while 
simultaneously changing the lives of thousands of people all across this 
eastern European country.  
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APPENDIX A 
Size of Digester 9
COSTS
Initial Cost of Construction
Installation Cost (USD)/m3 70
Average Cost of Installation 630
Man Hours for Construction (9 hours/m3) 81
Total Labor Cost (@ $5/hour) 405
Total Installation Cost 1035
Operation and Maintenance Costs
Annual O&M costs (3% of digester 
system turnkey cost) 31.05
Labor (44.34 hours annually * $5/hr) 221.7
Annual Maintenance and Labor Costs 252.75
Input Costs
Market Price of Corn Silage (per metric 
ton) $55.96
Quantity of Silage per Batch (metric 
tons) 0.288
Total Cost of Silage per Batch $16.12
Length of Retention Time (days) 10
Batches per Year 36
Annual Silage Cost $580.19
Annual Maintenance and Labor Costs 
(from above) $252.75
Total Annual Costs of Operation $832.94
REVENUES
Quantity of Silage per Batch (metric 
tons) 0.288
Biogas Yield of Silage (m3 per metric ton of silage)400
Biogas Production per Batch (m3) 115.2
Biogas Production per Year (m3) 4147.2
Amount of Methane Produced per m3 
Biogas (%) 80%
Amount of Methane Produced Per Batch 92.16
Number of Batches Per Year 36
Methane Production per Year (m3) 3317.76
Price of Natural Gas (100% Methane) 
per 1000 m3 in Q2 2011 (in USD) 280$         
Total Annual Value of Methane Output $928.97
TOTAL PROFIT $96.03
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30
REVENUES (MONTHLY)
New Loans 100           500             1,200          2,000            2,200            2,400            2,000            1,800            1,500            1,800            2,000            1,800              1,500              1,800              
Loans Outstanding 100           600             1,800          3,800            6,000            8,300            9,800            10,400          9,900            9,500            9,100            8,900              8,600              8,900              
Revenue (Monthly) 2,184        13,104       39,312       82,992          131,040       181,272       214,032       227,136       216,216       207,480       198,744       194,376          187,824          194,376          
Revenue (Annual) 26,208     157,248     471,744     995,904       1,572,480    2,175,264    2,568,384    2,725,632    2,594,592    2,489,760    3,239,964    3,168,756      3,061,944      3,168,756      
COSTS (MONTHLY)
Installation of Digesters 8,625        43,125       103,500     172,500       189,750       207,000       172,500       155,250       129,375       155,250       172,500       155,250          129,375          155,250          
Number of Operating 
Branches 1                1                  1                  1                    2                    2                    2                    2                    3                    3                    4                    5                       7                       8                       
Staff 2                5                  8                  10                  15                  17                  19                  21                  24                  26                  37                  48                    60                    71                    
Cost of Labor 560           1,400          2,240          2,800            4,200            4,760            5,320            5,880            6,720            7,280            10,360          13,440            16,800            19,880            
Cost of Rent 500           500             500             500                1,000            1,000            1,000            1,000            1,500            1,500            2,000            2,500              3,500              4,000              
Cost of Utilities 100           100             100             100                200                200                200                200                300                300                400                500                  700                  800                  
Cost of Office Equipment 
& Accessories 1,000        300             300             300                1,300            600                600                600                1,600            900                1,200            1,500              2,800              2,400              
Filing Fees 11              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Costs (Monthly) 10,796     45,425       106,640     176,200       196,450       213,560       179,620       162,930       139,495       165,230       186,460       173,190          153,175          182,330          
Revenue (Annual) 26,208     157,248     471,744     995,904       1,572,480    2,175,264    2,568,384    2,725,632    2,594,592    2,489,760    3,239,964    3,168,756      3,061,944      3,168,756      
Costs (Annual) 129,556   545,100     1,279,680 2,114,400    2,357,400    2,562,720    2,155,440    1,955,160    1,673,940    1,982,760    2,237,520    2,078,280      1,838,100      2,187,960      
PROFITS (Annual) (103,348) (387,852)   (807,936)   (1,118,496)  (784,920)      (387,456)      412,944       770,472       920,652       507,000       1,002,444    1,090,476      1,223,844      980,796          
Total Number of Digesters 100           600             1,800          3,800            6,000            8,400            10,400          12,200          13,700          15,500          24,600          33,500            42,100            51,000            
Amount of CO2 offset  
(tonnes) 567           3,402          10,206       21,546          34,020          47,628          58,968          69,174          77,679          87,885          139,482       189,945          238,707          289,170          
Value of ERUs 10,626     63,753       191,260     403,772       637,535       892,549       1,105,060    1,296,321    1,455,704    1,646,965    2,613,893    3,559,569      4,473,369      5,419,046      
Natural Gas Produced (m3) 330,000   1,980,000 5,940,000 12,540,000 19,800,000 27,720,000 34,320,000 40,260,000 45,210,000 51,150,000 81,180,000 110,550,000 138,930,000 168,300,000 
A
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SUMMARY 
 
 With rising gas prices, countries all across the world are finding 
themselves in precarious and vulnerable situations.  With increasing globalism 
also comes increasing dependence on other countries for a variety of imports, 
the most important of which being energy.  The production and consumption 
of natural gas and other fossil-fuel based energy products will undoubtedly 
become a more and more contentious issue as global supplies decrease if 
demand for these fuels remains constant or increases.  Few countries have had 
to face this situation as head-on as Ukraine.  Relying on any country for 69% 
of its natural gas supply would be particularly problematic, but when this 
country is also a former hostile occupier of the country it is easy to see how 
this situation has the potential for conflict that could reverberate across the 
world.   
 This paper seeks to identify and evaluate alternative fuels that could be 
implemented in Ukraine as a part of a strategic plan to reduce Ukraine’s 
dependency on Russia for energy.  While a number of renewable energy 
technologies exist, anaerobic digestion was selected because of its versatility, 
scalability, and relatively low cost of construction and operation.  In addition, 
these digesters can be fueled by any biodegradable material.  One of the inputs 
with the highest biogas potential (efficiency) is corn silage, a product used by 
fermenting undesired parts of the corn stalk that is generally used for feeding 
livestock.  The process for creating this silage requires very simple techniques 
and on many rural farms across the country this silage is already produced.   
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As a result, these rural farms quickly emerged as a potential target 
population for these digesters for a variety of reasons, including: ownership of 
large amounts of land upon which to build these digesters and existing 
production of the input.  Using the rural farmer’s annual demand of 4,200 
cubic meters of natural gas, I was able to derive the size of the digester 
required to produce exactly that amount of biogas.  The size of the digester 
needed was determined to be 9 cubic meters.  By calculating the value of the 
biogas produced (determined to be 80% methane) and identifying the total 
costs of operation, maintenance, and producing the corn silage needed as an 
input, I conducted a financial analysis of the digester (not yet taking into 
account the cost of construction) and showed that this particular digester size 
would produce annual profits of $96.03 a year and have a positive net present 
value of $442.  In addition, while this paper did not assign a value to the 
benefits afforded to a rural home from being completely independent from 
foreign energy, it is assumed that the dependability and self-sufficiency of the 
system would add value to the project.  
However, as I mentioned previously, we have not yet taken into 
account the cost of construction both in our calculations and in our strategy 
for implementation.  While these rural farmers have the optimal location for 
installation of these digesters, they do not have the financial means to afford a 
large lump sum payment of $1,035 required for the materials and labor 
necessary to construct the digester.  In addition, these rural farmers (with 
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annual incomes of approximately $3,000) do not have access to the traditional 
bank loans that would allow them to borrow this amount of money.   
This is where the role of microfinance comes in.  Microfinance has 
successfully been introduced in countries all across the world and is defined as 
the provisioning of credit to low-income people who would otherwise not 
have access to it.  Ukraine is no exception, as it is home to two microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) that provide no-collateral seasonal agricultural loans and 
loans for entrepreneurial ventures.  This paper postulates the creation of an 
MFI named “Zapravky Maybutnye Ukraïni” (which is Ukrainian for 
“Fueling Ukraine’s Future”) that would begin offering one product in the form 
of a lease for the construction of the digester.  This lease amount would be 
$1135 (the cost of the digester’s construction plus a $100 processing fee) that 
would be repaid over the course of five years.  The borrowing methodology 
would be a modified version of the solidarity lending principle.  In absence of 
collateral, the institution would require borrowers to organize into groups of 
five and leases would only be extended to the second borrower if the first 
borrower had begun the repayment process and attended all required training 
sessions, and so on until the fifth borrower received the digester.  Once all five 
borrowers had received a digester and begun the repayment process, the cycle 
would return to the first borrower who would then be eligible for seasonal 
agricultural loans that could assist the farmer in building their capacity.   
A financial analysis was then conducted for both the borrower and the 
institution to evaluate the effect that these leases would have on the financial 
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means of both parties.  It was found that borrowers would benefit from 
producing this biogas and being able to offset completely their previous 
purchase of natural gas.  In the first year through the fifth year, the value of 
the methane produced from the digester (80% of the biogas) equated to 
$928.97 while the cost of lease repayment, corn silage, operation, and 
maintenance amounted to $873.36.  This left the borrower with a slim, but 
positive, annual profit of $55.61 in the first five years.  Once the lease had 
been repaid in full, their annual profit would increase to $317.73 as their 
annual costs decrease to $611.24 and their revenues remain constant at 
$928.97. 
In addition, ZMU would also be able to generate profit from the 
operations, although not immediately due to the structure of its cash flows.  
While their costs (in the form of paying for the materials and labor necessary 
for the construction of the digester) would be due as a lump sum, their 
revenues (in the form of borrowers’ lease repayment) would not recover those 
costs until 5 years later.  As a result, the institution would not become self-
sustainable and post profits until year 7 of operations.  At that point, the 
institution would have matured and begun to level out to issue approximately 
1,800 new loans per year, have an outstanding loan portfolio of 8,900 loans 
being repaid, and annual profits of the institution would be approximately 
$1.1 million.  This paper extrapolated growth until year 30, at which point the 
digesters issued in year 1 would be taken out of commission, when nearly 
51,000 digesters would have been built and in operation. 
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 The environmental benefits that this institution could generate would 
come as a result of offsetting emissions that would have otherwise been 
released if these rural farms had continued burning natural gas.  This is due to 
the fact that anaerobic digestion is a carbon neutral system, as the corn that is 
being used as an input has already removed carbon from the atmosphere.  As 
long as the undigested material that is removed from the digester after the 
biogas has been produced is used as a fertilizer to grow more corn, the system 
is carbon neutral and all emissions from the burning of the biogas are offset.  
As a result, this institution would be responsible for an amount of carbon 
dioxide offset equal to 567 metric tons in year 1 that will grow to over 
260,000 metric tons annually in year 30.   
These carbon dioxide offsets have financial benefits too.  Projects that 
help to offset one metric ton of carbon dioxide can be eligible for the 
production of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) that can be sold on an 
international market.  The European Climate Exchange currently values these 
ERUs at $18.74/metric ton of carbon dioxide offset.  The combined offset of 
digesters all across Ukraine built from this institution has the potential to 
generate a significant amount of additional revenue to this institution, 
approximately $5.5 million annually in year 30.  
  Finally, the amount of methane (natural gas) that is produced from 
these digesters is an important finding of this paper, as it directly addresses the 
initial problem of energy dependency.  In order to determine this number, I 
multiplied 3,300 cubic meters of methane (the amount of pure methane 
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generated by each digester) by the total number of digesters in operation in 
year 30 (51,000) and found that the natural gas production that this institution 
is responsible for would be 168.3 million cubic meters in year 30. 
While this paper concentrated on a particular country, the importance 
and significance of this paper is in fact the implications that this institution 
could have on other countries all across the world.  Ukraine is absolutely not 
alone in being dependent on other countries for energy.  In fact, other than the 
major producers of fossil fuels, there is some level of energy imports present 
in every country’s economy.  The advantage and uniqueness of this project 
lies in the fact that its technology can operate in almost any climate and its 
microfinance methodology can be transferred to nearly any low-income 
country in the world.  With rising oil and natural gas prices, more and more of 
these renewable technologies will become financially feasible.  As our 
world’s supply of energy decreases and demand remains constant, or 
increases, we must be prepared for identifying alternative sources of where we 
obtain our energy from.  For when the wells run dry, who will be left standing 
out in the cold?   
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